The turn to modern science in the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century is typically characterized as dependent on the novel adoption of a mechanical hypothesis for operations in nature. In fact, the Middle Ages saw a partial anticipation of this phenomenon in the scholastic physics of the thirteenth century. More precisely, it was just the two factors, denial of action at a distance and an emphasis on the primary materiality of causation, that constituted this early mechanism-or "protomechanism." The latter's emergence can be seen most clearly where scholastic thinkers-here, William of Auvergne, Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome-confronted the theoretical limits of natural cause and effect in their efforts to determine the reality of magic and locate its place in the natural world.
For many in the contemporary world, the epitome of reason is science. In the United States in particular, science is further defined quite narrowly to mean natural science. In either case, one can make an argument that the resulting cultural priorities have worked to the benefit or, conversely, to the detriment of the conditions of human existence. Political debates over the consequences of "mod-magic and the physical world ernization," "westernization" and "development" provide abundant evidence of the ease with which opposing positions on the issue can be sustained. Leaving aside such normative concerns, let us for the moment simply take as given the common association of "science" and "modernity" as well as the equally commonplace assumption that "science" in the modern world constitutes a special form of the general category of intellectual artifacts known throughout history by that name, a form of it that is especially rational or reasonably worthy of our estimation. With that as ideological background, this article will focus on just one piece of an influential theoretical model according to which modern science, in particular modern natural science, has been conceived.
Historians commonly take stock of what we call modern science by locating its beginnings in the so-called Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. Standard for a long time has been the presumption that the ideological momentum propelling this revolution, and in a formal sense summing it up, was a set of ideas and attitudes called, already in the seventeenth century itself, the "Mechanical Philosophy" or, in Robert Boyle's more cautious words, the "mechanical hypothesis."
1 In his fascinating recent book, Atoms and Alchemy. Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution, William Newman offers a useful synopsis of the current historical understanding of "mechanism"-as we might label this philosophy or hypothesis-a complex analytical instrument consisting of at least three parts (or alternatively, three different modulations) in differing degrees of emphasis.
2 The first is "structural reduc tionism," by which he means the ultimate explanation of all natural phenomena as due to the spatial distribution and interaction of tiny corpuscular components, whether they be thought of as absolutely simple and indivisible or not. Second is "denial of action at a distance," which needs no clarification. The third amounts
